By Frank L. Smith III
Biological guns have threatened U.S. nationwide protection considering no less than global conflict II. traditionally, notwithstanding, the U.S. army has overlooked learn, improvement, acquisition, and doctrine for biodefense. Following September eleven and the anthrax letters of 2001, the U.S. all started spending billions of greenbacks in keeping with yr on scientific countermeasures and organic detection structures. yet so much of this investment now comes from the dept of healthiness and Human providers instead of the dep. of protection. Why has the U.S. army ignored biodefense and allowed civilian agencies to take the lead in protecting the rustic opposed to organic assaults? In American Biodefense, Frank L. Smith III addresses this confusing and mostly untold tale approximately technological know-how, know-how, and nationwide security.
Smith argues that organizational frames and stereotypes have triggered either army forget and the increase of civilian biodefense. within the armed prone, influential rules approximately kinetic war have undermined safeguard opposed to organic war. The impression of those rules on technological know-how and know-how demanding situations the normal knowledge that nationwide safety coverage is pushed by way of threats or bureaucratic pursuits. Given the information at paintings contained in the U.S. army, Smith explains how the teachings discovered from biodefense will help remedy different vital difficulties that variety from radiation guns to cyber attacks.
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Extra resources for American Biodefense: How Dangerous Ideas about Biological Weapons Shape National Security
As a result, these ideas are no less observable than threats or interests. In addition, organizational frame theory identifies general mechanisms that are predictive and portable, including the path dependency of selective attention and learning. It therefore improves on cultural accounts and withstands theoretical challenges at least as well as realism and bureaucratic interests. Frames and stereotypes can also produce outcomes that differ from those anticipated by realism or bureaucratic interests.
Instead, the blast damage frame is part and parcel of a kinetic frame that is shared across the armed services.  Chapter 1 The dominance of this frame is further evidenced by the US military’s troubled history of counterinsurgency, given its failed attempts to use kinetic firepower for solving problems where this kind of force is of limited utility. Counterinsurgency is at least partially nonkinetic because “some of the best weapons for counterinsurgents do not shoot,” the process is slow, and political factors such as legitimacy are needed to win.
The rapid trauma caused by projectiles and explosives stands in sharp contrast to the injury done by biological weapons, which, as noted earlier, cause disease over extended periods of time. The relevant ideas differ as well. For example, kinetic concepts like the “kiloton” can be used to measure the destructive power of explosives, but they are meaningless in the context of BW. Conversely, biological concepts like “communicability,” “infective dose,” and “the basic reproduction number (R0)” can help analyze the spread of smallpox or plague, but these ideas are inapplicable to blast damage.